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We analyse the redistributional (dis)advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive
labour markets without imposing assumptions on the (in)eﬃciency of labour rationing. Compared to a
distributionally equivalent tax change, a minimum-wage increase raises involuntary unemployment, but
also raises skill formation as some individuals avoid unemployment. A minimum wage is an appropriate
instrument for redistribution if and only if the public revenue gains from additional skill formation
outweigh both the public revenue losses from additional unemployment and the utility losses of ineﬃcient
labour rationing. We show that this critically depends on how labour rationing is distributed among
workers. A necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum-wage increase is that the public revenue
gains from higher skill formation outweigh the revenue losses from higher unemployment. We write this
condition in terms of measurable suﬃcient statistics.
INTRODUCTION
The minimum wage has recently been at the forefront of the public debate on income
inequality. In 2013, US President Obama argued that income inequality is the deﬁning
challenge of our time and identiﬁed an increase in the minimum wage as a key step
towards a more equal distribution of income (White House 2013). While a subsequent
proposal to raise the federal minimum wage stranded in Congress, several US states,
counties and cities responded by raising their city-wide minimum wages. At the same
time, many European governments also turned to minimum-wage legislation in order to
reduce income inequality. Widely publicized examples of this include the 2015
introduction of a federal minimum wage in Germany, and the 2016 implementation of a
compulsory UK national ‘living wage’ for employees over 25 years of age. The obvious
policy relevance of the minimum wage has spawned a large economic literature on the
impact of minimum wages on levels of employment, the distribution of wages, and other
labour market outcomes.1 However, there is relatively little economic theory on the
desirability of a minimum wage vis-a-vis other instruments to redistribute income, such
as progressive income taxation. As a result, no satisfactory answer has yet been given to
the central question of this paper: is a minimum wage an appropriate instrument for
redistribution?
Policy debates about minimum-wage reforms tend to be highly contentious. A
striking illustration of this is a pair of rival letters sent to US federal policymakers in
2014. One of the letters favoured a higher minimum wage and the other opposed it, but
both were signed by hundreds of economists, including several Nobel prize winners.2 One
important reason for this controversy is that both proponents and opponents make
arguments that are either subjective in nature or empirically contested. Proponents of the
minimum wage emphasize the distributional beneﬁts as it raises the earnings of low-
skilled workers. However, the valuation of these distributional eﬀects requires an
intrinsically political judgment on which economists have little to say. Opponents of the
minimum wage emphasize that it reduces employment. However, there is no agreement
in the empirical literature on the adverse employment eﬀects of the minimum wage (Card
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and Krueger 1995; Neumark and Wascher 2006; Schmitt 2013; Manning 2016). Thus it is
hard to come to any consensus on the desirability of a minimum wage as long as the
debate is framed in terms of the gains from more income redistribution versus the costs of
higher unemployment. In this paper, we avoid this issue by analysing the minimum wage
not in isolation from, but in comparison to redistribution via the tax and transfer system.
This allows us to assess the desirability of a minimum wage with minimal reliance on
political judgments about the value of redistribution or controversial estimates of the
labour-demand eﬀects of a minimum wage.
We develop a relatively standard model of occupational choice and optimal income
redistribution, based on Diamond (1980) and Saez (2002), which we augment with a
minimum-wage policy. Firms demand high-skilled and low-skilled labour in perfectly
competitive labour markets. A minimum wage might be binding for low-skilled workers,
but not for high-skilled workers. Individuals are assumed to be heterogeneous in their
disutility of work in low-skilled and high-skilled occupations. This disutility represents
both the eﬀort costs of working in a given occupation and the costs of obtaining the
necessary skills. Depending on their disutility of work, individuals decide to do high-
skilled work or low-skilled work, or to be (voluntarily) unemployed. A binding minimum
wage ﬁxes the low-skilled wage, thereby rationing some individuals out of the low-skilled
labour market. Rationed individuals are unable to ﬁnd a low-skilled job, and are
therefore forced to choose between the high-skilled occupation and (involuntary)
unemployment. We remain entirely agnostic about which individuals are, and which
individuals are not, able to ﬁnd a low-skilled job. Hence we adopt a fully general
‘rationing schedule’ that determines how rationing is distributed among individuals with
diﬀerent disutilities of work. This contrasts with most of the theoretical literature, which
typically assumes that labour rationing is eﬃcient, that is, that rationing is exclusively
concentrated on individuals with the highest disutility of work. The general rationing
schedule that we adopt—which includes eﬃcient rationing as a special case—is more in
line with the fact that we lack good empirical evidence on the distribution of labour
rationing.
An important feature of our model is that the income redistribution of a minimum-
wage increase can be perfectly replicated by a change in income taxes. Perfectly
competitive, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms pay for the minimum wage by reducing high-skilled
wages. As a result, the minimum wage redistributes income from individuals with a high
income to individuals with a low income. The income tax could achieve the same income
redistribution by reducing taxes on low-income earners and raising taxes on high-income
earners. The relevant question therefore is: can a minimum wage achieve a given amount
of income redistribution from high- to low-skilled workers at lower eﬃciency costs than
the income tax? We obtain the answer to this question by analysing a policy reform that
raises the minimum wage and simultaneously adjusts taxes to leave net incomes of both
high- and low-skilled workers unaﬀected. We label this policy reform a net-income-
neutral (NIN) minimum-wage increase. The eﬀects of an NIN minimum-wage increase
precisely indicate how a minimum-wage increase diﬀers from a distributionally
equivalent change in taxes.3 As the policy reform leaves net incomes constant, it allows us
to assess the desirability of a minimum-wage increase exclusively in terms of economic
eﬃciency, without resorting to political judgments about the value of income
redistribution. Our paper makes three contributions.
First, we show that a minimum-wage increase diﬀers from a distributionally
equivalent change in taxes by creating more unemployment and more high-skilled
employment. Intuitively, an NIN increase in the minimum wage raises the wage costs of
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low-skilled workers. This reduces low-skilled labour demand and therefore rations some
individuals out of the low-skilled labour market. While some of these rationed
individuals become unemployed, others might prefer high-skilled employment over
unemployment, and therefore choose to become high-skilled. The magnitude of the
eﬀects on unemployment and high-skilled employment is crucially determined by the
rationing schedule. If rationing is mostly concentrated on individuals with a high (low)
disutility of high-skilled work, then rationing mostly leads to higher unemployment
(high-skilled employment). All other eﬀects of a minimum-wage increase are identical to
the eﬀects of a distributionally equivalent tax change.
Second, we derive a simple condition under which the minimum wage is an
appropriate instrument for redistribution. This is the case if a minimum-wage increase is
more desirable than a distributionally equivalent change in taxes. The desirability
condition reﬂects the three welfare-relevant eﬀects of an NIN increase in the minimum
wage. (i) Labour rationing reduces utility as long as the rationed individuals strictly
prefer low-skilled work over unemployment or high-skilled work. (ii) Increased
unemployment reduces public revenue if the unemployed pay fewer taxes than low-
skilled workers. (iii) Increased high-skilled employment raises public revenue if high-
skilled workers pay more taxes than low-skilled workers. A minimum-wage increase is
more desirable than a distributionally equivalent change in taxes if and only if the
revenue gains from increased high-skilled employment are suﬃciently high to
compensate for the revenue losses of increased unemployment and the utility losses from
ineﬃcient rationing. If the desirability condition holds in the tax optimum without a
minimum wage, then a minimum wage is necessarily part of the overall policy optimum.
Both optimal and observed taxes tend to increase with income, and therefore distort
labour participation and skill decisions downwards. The NIN minimum-wage increase
exacerbates the distortion on labour participation by raising unemployment. However, it
alleviates the tax distortion on skill formation by raising high-skilled employment. Hence
the second-best role of the minimum wage is to alleviate tax distortions on skill
formation.
Third, we derive a necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum-wage
increase that is solely expressed in terms of three empirically recoverable statistics.
Because an NIN minimum-wage increase leads to utility losses from ineﬃcient rationing,
the revenue gains from increased high-skilled employment must at least outweigh the
revenue losses from increased unemployment for the minimum-wage increase to be
desirable. This holds only if the increase in high-skilled employment is large enough
relative to the increase in unemployment. That is, rationing should be suﬃciently
concentrated on individuals who prefer high-skilled employment over unemployment.
The rationing schedule is therefore a crucial determinant of the desirability of a minimum
wage. While we lack any empirical evidence on the rationing schedule, we show that the
eﬀect of unemployment on skill formation can function as a suﬃcient statistic, foregoing
the need to determine the rationing schedule. Consequently, we can express the necessary
condition for the desirability of a minimum-wage increase in terms of the tax wedge on
participation, the tax wedge on skill formation, and the eﬀect of unemployment on skill
formation. This condition does not rely on controversial estimates of the labour-demand
eﬀects of a minimum wage. This is because both the beneﬁts (more high-skilled
employment) and the costs (more unemployment) of the NIN minimum-wage increase
are proportional to the reduction in labour demand.4
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section I discusses earlier
literature. Section II introduces the theoretical model. Section III deﬁnes the NIN
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minimum-wage increase and derives its comparative statics. Section IV derives the
welfare eﬀects of an NIN minimum-wage increase and the conditions under which a
minimum-wage increase is more desirable than a distributionally equivalent tax change.
It also determines whether a binding minimum wage could be a desirable supplement to
the tax optimum and considers the robustness of our results with respect to relaxing a
number of theoretical assumptions. Section V concludes with some ﬁnal thoughts.
I. EARLIER LITERATURE
This paper contributes to the literature that studies minimum wages in models of optimal
income redistribution and competitive labour markets. Most studies consider the two-
type optimal-tax framework of Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). Using this framework,
Allen (1987) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1987) ﬁnd that a binding minimum wage is
undesirable if the government could set non-linear income taxes.5 While they consider
only underemployment on the labour-hours margin, Marceau and Boadway (1994)
extend these analyses by considering involuntary unemployment on the extensive margin.
They ﬁnd that a minimum wage can be a desirable policy only if the unemployed receive
smaller transfers than the low-skilled employed. In that case, labour participation is
distorted upwards and a minimum wage alleviates this distortion by pushing some low-
skilled individuals out of the labour market. We contribute to these studies by
endogenizing the skill decisions of individuals. As a result, a minimum wage may yield
not only an increase in unemployment, but also an increase in high-skilled employment.
If skill formation is distorted downwards, then the minimum wage helps to alleviate the
distortions on skill formation. These distortions are absent in previous studies because
they assume that the skill distribution is exogenous.
The work of Lee and Saez (2012) is most closely related to our study. Like us, they
introduce a minimum wage to the occupational-choice model of Diamond (1980) and
Saez (2002). They assume that labour rationing is eﬃcient so that only individuals with
the lowest utility surplus of low-skilled work lose their jobs. A binding minimum wage
allows the government to give a tax cut to the low-skilled without distorting the
occupational choice of individuals. Intuitively, eﬃcient rationing ensures that there are
no low-skilled jobs for individuals who would want to get a low-skilled job in response to
the tax cut. In their Proposition 2, Lee and Saez (2012) ﬁnd that a minimum wage is
desirable if low-skilled workers have a marginal social welfare weight that is larger than
the average, which equals 1 in the optimum. Their Proposition 3 replicates Marceau and
Boadway (1994). Both results can be seen as special cases of our more general desirability
condition. We make four contributions compared to Lee and Saez (2012). First, we
demonstrate that the second-best role of the minimum wage is to alleviate distortions on
skill formation, which is not recognized by Lee and Saez (2012). Second, our desirability
condition is valid for any eﬃcient or ineﬃcient rationing schedule and therefore does not
require eﬃcient rationing. Third, our desirability condition for a minimum-wage increase
is valid at any initial allocation, not just at the tax optimum.6 Fourth, our desirability
condition is written in terms of empirically measurable wedges and elasticities instead of
subjective social welfare weights.
Also related are the works of Cahuc and Michel (1996) and Acemoglu (2001), who
show that a minimum wage might be desirable because it shifts labour demand from low-
to high-skilled jobs. While their results are therefore similar in spirit to ours, they both
rely on considerably diﬀerent welfare analyses. In Cahuc and Michel (1996), high-skilled
employment is ineﬃciently low because of positive technological spillovers. In Acemoglu
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(2001), ﬁrms need to employ more capital to hire high-skilled workers than to hire low-
skilled workers. The sunk-cost nature of these capital investments generates a hold-up
problem that yields ineﬃciently low high-skilled employment. In contrast to these
studies, in our framework high-skilled employment is ineﬃciently low because of a ﬁscal
externality: due to the government’s preference to redistribute income, high-skilled
workers tend to pay more taxes than low-skilled workers.
A number of other studies shows that a minimum wage could be desirable alongside
taxes and transfers if combined with other speciﬁc policies, or if low-skilled workers are
heterogeneous in multiple dimensions. Boadway and Cuﬀ (2001) consider the framework
of Mirrlees (1971) and ﬁnd that a minimum wage is desirable if it can be combined with a
policy that forces the unemployed to accept any job that they can ﬁnd. Danziger and
Danziger (2015) ﬁnd a useful role for the minimum wage if it can be combined with a
policy that forces ﬁrms to hire a certain number of low-skilled workers, even if their
marginal productivity is below the minimum wage. Blumkin and Danziger (2018)
consider a case in which the government redistributes from ‘lazy’ to ‘hard-working’ low-
skilled workers who earn the same wage rate, but vary in the number of hours that they
work. They ﬁnd that a minimum wage may function as a useful screening device if it
reduces the labour hours of the lazy poor.
Finally, ever since Card and Krueger (1995), a large number of empirical studies ﬁnd
that the unemployment eﬀects of a minimum wage are either small (e.g. Harasztosi and
Lindner 2019) or statistically insigniﬁcant (e.g. Cengiz et al. 2019). This has led many to
question the relevance of the framework of perfectly competitive labour markets (e.g.
Schmitt 2013; Manning 2016). A small literature analyses the welfare properties of a
minimum wage in non-competitive labour markets. Notable studies include
Hungerb€uhler and Lehmann (2009), Cahuc and Laroque (2013), and Lavecchia (2019),
which all consider a minimum wage along with optimal taxes. Cahuc and Laroque (2013)
show that a minimum wage is not useful to reduce monopsony problems on the labour
market as long as the government has suﬃcient tax instruments at its disposal.
Hungerb€uhler and Lehmann (2009) and Lavecchia (2019) do ﬁnd a role for a minimum
wage alongside optimal non-linear labour income taxes if bargaining power of workers is
ineﬃciently low and the government cannot directly control bargaining power. Even if
our results were to indicate that a minimum wage is not an appropriate instrument for
redistribution, it may still be a useful tool to alleviate market imperfections.
II. MODEL
This section describes labour-supply decisions of individuals, labour-demand decisions of
ﬁrms, and the objective of the government. We develop a variation of the occupational-
choice models of Diamond (1980) and Saez (2002), extended with a binding minimum
wage.
Individuals
We consider a continuum of individuals of mass 1. The baseline model assumes that
individuals diﬀer in their ability h and their occupation i 2 {H,L,U}, which denotes
whether individuals are high-skilled (H), low-skilled (L) or unemployed (U). Ability is
continuously distributed on support [0,h] according to a cumulative distribution function
G(h) with a corresponding density function g(h). Based on their ability h, individuals
decide to participate as a high-skilled worker and earn wage income wH, to participate as
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a low-skilled worker and earn wage income wL, where wH > wL, or not to participate at all
and earn no wage income (wU  0). The government can impose a minimum wage by
ﬁxing the low-skilled wage wL. Moreover, it levies diﬀerentiated income taxes si for all
observed levels of wage income wi. If taxes for the unemployed are negative, then they
receive an unemployment beneﬁt sU. We assume that participation costs h are private
information. Hence, the government cannot distinguish between the voluntary unemployed
and the involuntary unemployed, so they both receive the same unemployment beneﬁts.
Individuals spend all their net income on consumption: ci = wisi.
Utility from consumption is given by an increasing and strictly concave function of
consumption ci, which is identical for all individuals: v(ci), v0()>0, v00()<0. When a
worker of ability h becomes low-skilled, she suﬀers disutility of work 1/h. When she
becomes high-skilled, her disutility equals (1 + b)/h. The parameter b > 0 is a constant
disutility markup of being high-skilled, which represents the eﬀort costs of becoming
high-skilled. Disutility of work is decreasing in ability h, and more so for high-skilled
work than for low-skilled work. As a result, individuals with higher ability have a
comparative advantage in high-skilled work. Non-participants do not incur any disutility
of work. In Online Appendix C, we generalize our model to allow for two-dimensional
heterogeneity, where individuals incur disutility of low-skilled work 1/hL and disutility of
high-skilled work 1/hH, with hL and hH drawn from a joint distribution G(hL,hH).7 All our
main results carry over to the more general setting. We return to this when discussing the
robustness of our results.
Utilities of the high-skilled, the low-skilled, and the unemployed are thus given by
VHh  vðwH  sHÞ 
1þ b
h
;ð1Þ
VLh  vðwL  sLÞ 
1
h
;ð2Þ
VU  vðsUÞ;ð3Þ
where subscripts indicate that both high- and low-skilled utility depend on individual
ability h. Each individual optimally decides whether to participate in the labour market
and whether to work as a low-skilled or a high-skilled worker. Figure 1 provides a
stylized graph of utility as a function of ability. H1  fh : VU ¼ VLh g is the ability level
at which an individual is indiﬀerent between unemployment and low-skilled employment.
H2  fh : VU ¼ VHh g is the ability level at which an individual is indiﬀerent between
unemployment and high-skilled employment. H3  fh : VLh ¼ VHh g is the ability level at
which an individual is indiﬀerent between low-skilled and high-skilled employment.
Equations (1)–(3) imply thatH1,H2 andH3 are uniquely determined and equal to
H1 ¼
1
vðwL  sLÞ  vðsUÞ ;ð4Þ
H2 ¼
1þ b
vðwH  sHÞ  vðsUÞ ;ð5Þ
H3 ¼
b
vðwH  sHÞ  vðwL  sLÞ :ð6Þ
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A higher unemployment beneﬁt (sU) makes non-participation more attractive and
therefore raises H1 and H2. Similarly, an increase in low-skilled net income (w
L  sL)
makes low-skilled employment more attractive and therefore lowers H1 and raises H3.
Finally, an increase in high-skilled net income (wH  sH) makes high-skilled employment
more attractive and therefore lowers both H2 and H3. We focus on non-trivial equilibria
that contain at least some high- and low-skilled workers, which requires that
h [ H3 [ H2 [ H1.
8 In terms of Figure 1, this implies that high- and low-skilled utility
curves cross somewhere above the line for unemployed utility.
Labour-supply decisions of individuals are determined by their preference orderings
over the diﬀerent occupations. Figure 1 clearly illustrates how these preferences depend
on ability h. Individuals with low ability h 2 ½0;H1Þ prefer non-participation over
anything else. Individuals with high ability h 2 ðH3; h prefer high-skilled employment
over anything else. And individuals with intermediate ability h 2 ½H1;H3 prefer low-
skilled employment over anything else. However, with a binding minimum wage, not
every individual with ability h 2 ½H1;H3 is able to ﬁnd a low-skilled job. This is because
a minimum wage wL makes low-skilled employment more attractive, while—as we show
below—reducing low-skilled labour demand. This results in low-skilled labour rationing.
In our baseline model, we assume that individuals know whether they are able to ﬁnd
a low-skilled job before making their labour-supply decisions. When individuals ﬁgure
out that they cannot ﬁnd a low-skilled job, they must decide between (involuntary)
unemployment and high-skilled employment. As illustrated in Figure 1, rationed
individuals with ability h 2 ½H1;H2Þ prefer unemployment over high-skilled employment
and thus become unemployed. Rationed individuals with ability h 2 ½H2;H3 prefer
high-skilled employment over unemployment and become high-skilled employed.
Alternatively, we could assume that individuals make their labour-supply decisions
before knowing whether they are able to ﬁnd a low-skilled job. Individual labour supply
then depends on the expected utility of low-skilled work, which itself depends on the
probability of ﬁnding a job. We show in Online Appendix B that our main results are not
aﬀected by this alternative sequencing of rationing and labour-supply decisions. We
brieﬂy return to this when discussing the robustness of our theoretical results.
Utility
V U
V L
V H
Θ1 Θ2 Θ3
θ 
θ 
θ 
FIGURE 1. Utility as a function of ability.
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Rationing and aggregate labour supply
Aggregate supply of high- and low-skilled labour depends on which workers are not able
to ﬁnd a low-skilled job. The proportion of individuals with ability h who are not able to
ﬁnd a job is denoted by the rationing rate uh.
9 The rationing schedule is the set of all
rationing rates.
Deﬁnition 1. The rationing schedule {uh} assigns a rationing rate uh to every ability level
h 2 ½H1;H3, which speciﬁes the proportion of individuals with ability h who are not able
to ﬁnd a low-skilled job.
By imposing no structure on the rationing schedule, we remain agnostic about which
workers are unable to ﬁnd a low-skilled job due to a binding minimum wage. We later
demonstrate that the rationing schedule critically aﬀects the desirability of a minimum
wage.
Earlier literature on minimum wages most often assumes that rationing is eﬃcient.
Thus if low-skilled workers are heterogeneous, then earlier studies usually assume that
rationing aﬀects only individuals who have the lowest utility surplus of work (e.g.
Boadway and Cuﬀ 2001; Lee and Saez 2012; Blumkin and Danziger 2018). If low-skilled
workers are homogeneous, then earlier studies assume either that rationing takes place
on the intensive margin (Allen 1987; Guesnerie and Roberts 1987), or that low-skilled
workers are indiﬀerent between working and not working (Marceau and Boadway 1994).
In both cases, the utility losses of rationing are second-order. Uniform or random
rationing is sometimes considered as an alternative to eﬃcient rationing. In that case, the
likelihood that someone is rationed out of the low-skilled labour market is the same for
everyone (e.g. Lee and Saez 2008; Gerritsen and Jacobs 2013).
It is theoretically and empirically unclear why labour rationing would be either
eﬃcient or uniform (Luttmer 2007). There is generally no secondary market for jobs that
could (re)allocate jobs to individuals with the highest utility surplus of work. This makes
it unlikely that rationing is eﬃcient. At the same time, there is also little reason to expect
that rationing is uniform and therefore entirely independent of individuals’ surplus of
work. Thus an important contribution of our study is that we consider minimum wages
without imposing any speciﬁc rationing schedule. Our general rationing schedule could
capture any arbitrary relationship between rationing and ability, and contains eﬃcient
and uniform rationing as special cases.10
Aggregating the labour supply of all individuals, while using the deﬁnition of the
rationing schedule, yields the following expressions for aggregate high- and low-skilled
labour supply, and unemployment:
H ¼ 1 GðH3Þ þ
Z H3
H2
uh dGðhÞ;ð7Þ
L ¼
Z H3
H1
ð1 uhÞ dGðhÞ;ð8Þ
U ¼ GðH1Þ þ
Z H2
H1
uh dGðhÞ:ð9Þ
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of aggregate labour supply. For illustrative
purposes, we show the case of a uniform ability distribution, so that g(h) is constant. The
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area below the rationing curve uhg(h) represents the individuals who are rationed out of
the low-skilled labour market. Depending on their ability, they become either
unemployed or high-skilled employed. The area above the rationing curve represents the
individuals who are not rationed out of the low-skilled labour market. Thus the areas
denoted by U represent voluntary and involuntary unemployment. The area denoted by
L represents low-skilled employment. And the areas denoted by H represent high-skilled
employment.
Firms
Aggregate demand for high-skilled workers is denoted by Hd, and aggregate demand for
low-skilled workers is denoted by Ld. A competitive, representative ﬁrm takes wages as
given and demands high- and low-skilled labour to maximize proﬁts. Workers of the
same skill type—but diﬀerent ability h—are perfect substitutes in production, whereas
high-skilled labour and low-skilled labour are imperfect substitutes in production. The
production technology F() is homogeneous of degree 1, and given by
FðHd;LdÞ; FH;FL[ 0; FHH;FLL\0; FHL[ 0;ð10Þ
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Production features positive but diminishing
marginal products of both factors. High- and low-skilled labour are cooperant factors of
production. Proﬁt-maximization requires that marginal labour products equal wages:11
FHðHd;LdÞ ¼ wH;ð11Þ
FLðHd;LdÞ ¼ wL:ð12Þ
Due to constant returns to scale in production, there are no pure proﬁts in
equilibrium. Equations (11) and (12) imply downward-sloping labour demand curves.
As a result, a higher minimum wage is associated with reduced low-skilled labour
demand.
Equilibrium
For a given government policy fwL; sU; sL; sHg, equations (7)–(9) describe aggregate
high- and low-skilled labour supplies as functions of the high-skilled wage and the
Θ1 Θ2 Θ30
U
L
H
H
U
g (  )θ   
g (  )u θ   θ   
θ   
FIGURE 2. A stylized representation of equilibrium.
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rationing schedule. Equations (11) and (12) describe aggregate labour demand as a
function of the high-skilled wage. The economy is in general equilibrium if the high-
skilled wage and the rationing schedule are such that aggregate labour supply equals
labour demand: H = Hd and L = Ld. Because the minimum wage is binding only for
low-skilled labour, the high-skilled wage freely adjusts to ensure that the high-skilled
labour market clears in equilibrium. However, a binding minimum wage makes low-
skilled wage adjustments impossible. Instead, labour rationing adjusts to ensure
equilibrium on the low-skilled labour market. As can be seen from Figure 2, there are an
inﬁnite number of possible rationing schedules {uh} that yield the same equilibrium
levels of aggregate employment. This indeterminacy has important implications for the
comparative statics and welfare eﬀects of the minimum wage, as we show in the
following sections.
Government
The government sets a minimum wage wL and income taxes fsH; sL; sUg. The critical
informational assumption of our analysis is that individual earnings are veriﬁable. The
government can thus simultaneously implement an income tax and enforce a binding
minimum wage for the low-skilled. Our approach is informationally consistent because
the implementations of both the income tax and the minimum wage require the same
information on individual earnings.12
We assume that the social welfare functionW is utilitarian:
W  UVU þ
Z H2
H1
ð1 uhÞVLh dGðhÞ þ
Z H3
H2
uhV
H
h dGðhÞ þ
Z h
H3
VHh dGðhÞ:ð13Þ
None of our ﬁndings depend on the assumption of a utilitarian social welfare function.
Stronger redistributional concerns can be introduced by, for example, weighting
individual utilities with Pareto weights or by summing over a concave transformation of
individual utilities. The government budget constraint B is given by
B  UsU þ LsL þHsH  R ¼ 0;ð14Þ
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement.
III. A NET-INCOME-NEUTRALMINIMUM-WAGE INCREASE
Deﬁning the net-income-neutral minimum-wage increase
A minimum wage can raise the income of low-skilled workers, but so can the tax
system.13 The relevant question therefore is: how does a change in the minimum wage
diﬀer from a distributionally equivalent change in the income tax system? This question
can be approached in two diﬀerent but equivalent ways. One could derive the eﬀects of
an increase in the minimum wage in isolation, as well as the eﬀects of a distributionally
equivalent tax change, and then take the diﬀerence between the eﬀects of the two
separate reforms. Or one could derive the eﬀects of a combined reform that
simultaneously raises the minimum wage and adjusts taxes to leave net wages
unaﬀected. Both approaches are logically equivalent and therefore yield identical results.
We take the latter approach and label the combined reform a net-income-neutral (NIN)
increase in the minimum wage.
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Analysing an NIN increase in the minimum wage has several important advantages.
First, the NIN minimum-wage increase allows us to ignore many behavioural eﬀects
that a minimum-wage increase has in common with a distributionally equivalent
change in taxes. This greatly reduces the analytical complexity associated with deriving
the comparative statics.14 Second, because the reform leaves net incomes unaﬀected, we
can focus the welfare analysis exclusively on the eﬃciency gains and losses of a
minimum-wage increase relative to a distributionally equivalent change in taxes. This
allows us to analyse the desirability of a minimum wage without taking a stance on
inherently subjective political preferences for income redistribution.15,16 Third, the
welfare analysis of the reform gives a necessary condition for the relative desirability of
a minimum wage that is expressed solely in terms of suﬃcient statistics that could be
measured empirically.
The following lemma formally deﬁnes the NIN minimum-wage increase and derives
the changes in taxes that are necessary to maintain net-income neutrality.
Lemma 1. A net-income-neutral increase in the minimum wage raises the minimum wage
by dwL > 0, keeps the unemployment beneﬁt constant (dsU ¼ 0), raises the low-skilled
tax by dsL ¼ dwL, and lowers the high-skilled tax such that dsH ¼ dwH ¼
ðL=HÞ dwL\ 0.
Proof. Equate the total derivative of net income wisi to zero to ﬁnd dsi = dwi for
i 2 {H,L,U}. Linear homogeneity of the production function together with equations
(11) and (12) implies zero equilibrium proﬁts: F(H,L)  wHH  wLL = 0. Take the total
derivative and rearrange to ﬁndHdwH = LdwL. Rewrite to obtain the result.
A minimum wage compresses the wage diﬀerential between high- and low-skilled
workers due to complementarity of labour types in production (i.e. FHL > 0).
Intuitively, an increase in the low-skilled wage drives down low-skilled labour demand,
which, in turn, lowers the productivity and wages of high-skilled workers. The increase in
the low-skilled wage is fully paid for by a decrease in high-skilled wages
(H dwH = L dwL). This follows logically from the absence of proﬁts due to constant
returns to scale in production. To fully neutralize the changes in gross wages, the NIN
minimum-wage reform therefore raises low-skilled taxes and lowers high-skilled taxes,
while keeping unemployment beneﬁts constant.
Comparative statics
The behavioural eﬀects of the NIN minimum-wage increase are critical for the welfare
analysis that we conduct below. We graphically illustrate the eﬀects of the NIN
minimum-wage increase in Figure 3. The policy reform has no eﬀect on individual
preferences for diﬀerent occupations. Since net wages do not change, equations (4)–(6)
imply that the cut-oﬀs H1, H2 and H3 remain unaﬀected. The only eﬀect of the policy
reform is that individuals may change their occupation due to a change in low-skilled
labour rationing. The NIN minimum-wage increase raises low-skilled labour costs, and
therefore results in a reduction of low-skilled employment (dL < 0). This is indicated by
the upward shift of the rationing schedule in Figure 3. As a result, some individuals with
ability h 2 ½H1;H2Þ might lose their low-skilled jobs and move into unemployment
(dU ≥ 0). These rationed workers prefer unemployment over high-skilled employment.
Similarly, some individuals with ability h 2 ½H2;H3 might also lose their low-skilled
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jobs, and move into high-skilled employment (dH ≥ 0). These workers prefer high-skilled
employment over unemployment.
What happens to unemployment and high-skilled employment crucially depends on
how the increase in rationing is distributed among low-skilled workers; that is, it depends
on the change in the rationing schedule. In what follows, we use q as a measure of the
proportion of additional rationing that is concentrated on individuals who prefer high-
skilled employment over unemployment:
q 
RH3
H2
duh dGðhÞRH3
H1
duh dGðhÞ
¼ dHdL 2 ½0; 1:ð15Þ
In terms of Figure 3, qmeasures the increase in the areas denoted byH relative to the
decrease in the area denoted by L. The larger q, the more a given increase in labour
rationing translates into an increase in high-skilled employment. We assume that duh ≥ 0
for all h, which ensures that q 2 [0,1]. At one extreme, if q = 1, then all additional
rationing is concentrated on low-skilled workers with relatively high ability. In that case,
rationing leads to more high-skilled employment without causing any increase in
unemployment. At the other extreme, if q = 0, then all additional rationing is
concentrated on low-skilled workers with relatively low ability. In that case, rationing
does not aﬀect high-skilled employment but only raises unemployment. Armed with the
deﬁnition of q, we can formally state the comparative statics of an NIN minimum-wage
increase in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The general-equilibrium comparative statics of the NIN minimum-wage
increase, as described by Lemma 1, are
dVU ¼ dVLh ¼ dVHh ¼ dH1 ¼ dH2 ¼ dH3 ¼ 0;ð16Þ
dH ¼
Z H3
H2
duh dGðhÞ ¼ qae
dwL
wL
 0;ð17Þ
dL ¼
Z H3
H1
duh dGðhÞ ¼ ae
dwL
wL
\0;ð18Þ
g (  )θ   
U
U
L
H
H
Θ1 Θ2 Θ30 θ   
FIGURE 3. Comparative statics of a net-income-neutral minimum-wage increase.
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dU ¼
Z H2
H1
duh dGðhÞ ¼ ð1 qÞae
dwL
wL
 0;ð19Þ
where ɛ  FL/(LFLL) > 0 is the labour-demand elasticity and a  (1/L + q/H)1 > 0
is a share parameter.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As the reform is net-income neutral, it leaves occupation-speciﬁc utility unaﬀected. This
is shown in equation (16). However, some individuals may still incur a utility loss,
because an increase in rationing forces them out of a low-skilled job and into a less-
preferred occupation. Relative to a distributionally equivalent change in taxes, a
minimum-wage increase leads to a reduction in low-skilled employment (dL < 0). This
(weakly) increases both unemployment (dU ≥ 0) and high-skilled employment (dH ≥ 0).
The reduction in low-skilled employment is equal to the total increase in rationing due to
an NIN minimum-wage increase, as shown by equation (18). Unsurprisingly, the higher
the labour-demand elasticity ɛ, the larger the increase in low-skilled labour rationing.
A fraction q of the additional labour rationing reﬂects an increase in high-skilled employ-
ment; that is, dH = qdL ≥ 0, as shown in equation (17). As long as q > 0, the NIN
reform leads to more high-skilled employment. Similarly, a fraction 1  q of the
additional rationing reﬂects higher unemployment; that is, dU = (1  q) dL ≥ 0, as
shown in equation (19). As long as q < 1, the NIN reform leads to more unemployment.
The idea that rationing raises high-skilled employment plays a crucial role in the
welfare analysis of the minimum wage. It is therefore important to emphasize that this
eﬀect of rationing is not merely a theoretical possibility. There is a sizeable literature that
conﬁrms the empirical relevance of a positive relationship between low-skilled
unemployment and skill formation; see, for instance, Clark (2011) for the UK, Kane
(1994) and Card and Lemieux (2001) for the USA, and Petrongolo and San Segundo
(2002) for Spain. While these studies tend to focus on the eﬀects of business-cycle
ﬂuctuations in unemployment, recent evidence indicates that more structural declines in
employment opportunities have had a similar eﬀect on skill formation. Foged and Peri
(2015) study the eﬀects of a plausibly exogenous increase in immigration, and show that
low-skilled immigrants push low-skilled native workers towards more non-manual and
better-paid occupations. In line with our theoretical prediction, this suggests that a
decline in employment opportunities for low-skilled workers leads them to improve their
skills.17
IV. WELFARE ANALYSIS
A desirability condition for the minimum wage
The following proposition is the main result of the paper. It provides the condition under
which a minimum-wage increase is more desirable than a distributionally equivalent
change in the tax system.
Proposition 1. A minimum-wage increase is more desirable than a distributionally
equivalent change in the tax system if and only if an NIN minimum-wage increase raises
social welfare, so that the following condition is satisﬁed:
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qðsH  sLÞ  ð1 qÞðsL  sUÞ[ ð1 qÞ V
L
12  VU
k
 !
þ q V
L
23  VH23
k
 !
;ð20Þ
where k is the shadow value of public resources,
V
L
12 
RH2
H1
VLh duh dGðhÞRH2
H1
duh dGðhÞ
and V
L
23 
RH3
H2
VLh duh dGðhÞRH3
H2
duh dGðhÞ
are the average low-skilled utilities of the individuals who are rationed by the reform and
have ability h 2 ½H1;H2Þ and h 2 ½H2;H3, respectively, and
V
H
23 
RH3
H2
VHh duh dGðhÞRH3
H2
duh dGðhÞ
is the average high-skilled utility of the individuals who are rationed by the reform and
have ability h 2 ½H2;H3.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the previous section, Lemma 2 established that an NIN increase in the minimum wage
raises unemployment and high-skilled employment at the cost of reduced low-skilled
employment, while leaving utility within any occupation unaﬀected. In line with this,
Proposition 1 establishes that the NIN minimum-wage reform aﬀects social welfare only
through changes in utility and public revenue that are caused by the increases in high-
skilled employment and unemployment. The left-hand side of equation (20) captures the
welfare eﬀects of the potential public revenue gains (dB), whereas the right-hand side
represents the welfare eﬀects of the potential utility losses (dW=k). We can distinguish
four welfare-relevant eﬀects of the NIN increase in the minimum wage: (i) it raises public
revenue from individuals who become high-skilled if sH [ sL (ﬁrst left-hand-side term);
(ii) it reduces public revenue from individuals who become unemployed if sL [ sU
(second left-hand-side term); (iii) it lowers the utility of individuals who become
involuntarily unemployed (ﬁrst right-hand-side term); and (iv) it lowers the utility of
individuals who become involuntarily high-skilled employed (second right-hand-side
term).
An NIN increase in the minimum wage leads to utility losses because rationed
individuals strictly prefer low-skilled work over any alternative occupation. This is
shown by the right-hand side of equation (20). Some rationed individuals become
unemployed and suﬀer utility losses that are—expressed in monetary units—on average
equal to ðVL12  VUÞ=k. This term is scaled by the proportion of rationed individuals who
become unemployed (1  q). Other rationed individuals switch to high-skilled
employment and suﬀer utility losses that are—expressed in monetary units—on average
equal to ðVL23  VH23Þ=k. This term is scaled by the proportion of rationed individuals who
become high-skilled (q). The total utility loss of the NIN minimum-wage increase
crucially depends on the eﬃciency of the rationing schedule. In the case of eﬃcient
rationing, all rationing is concentrated on individuals who are indiﬀerent between low-
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skilled employment and high-skilled employment or unemployment (i.e. on those who
have ability H1 or H3). In that case, V
L
12 ¼ VU and VL23 ¼ VH23, so that dW ¼ 0 and the
right-hand side of equation (20) vanishes. In any other case, the more ineﬃcient rationing
—that is, the more rationing is concentrated around ability H2—the higher the utility
losses associated with the minimum wage, and therefore the larger the right-hand side of
equation (20).
Thus the (in)eﬃciency of the rationing schedule determines the degree to which a
minimum wage generates utility losses. This has been pointed out by a number of
earlier studies (e.g. Lott 1990; Marceau and Boadway 1994; Palda 2000; Luttmer
2007; Lee and Saez 2012; Gerritsen 2017).18 What has not previously been recognized
is that the rationing schedule also crucially determines the eﬀect of the minimum
wage on government revenue. This is illustrated by the left-hand side of
equation (20). On the one hand, the increase in high-skilled employment leads to an
increase in public revenue if the high-skilled pay more taxes than the low-skilled (i.e.
if sH [ sL). This increase in revenue is larger if rationing induces more individuals to
become high-skilled (i.e. if q is larger). On the other hand, the increase in
unemployment leads to a reduction in public revenue if the low-skilled pay more
taxes than the unemployed (i.e. if sL [ sU). The reduction in revenue is larger if
rationing leads to more unemployment (i.e. if q is smaller). Thus the net eﬀect on
revenue crucially depends on the tax wedges ðsH  sLÞ and ðsL  sUÞ, and on the
fraction of rationing q that is concentrated on individuals who prefer high-skilled
employment over unemployment.
Provided that taxes are increasing with income, Proposition 1 shows that an increase
in the minimum wage may be desirable only if its eﬀect on high-skilled employment is
suﬃciently large. Thus the minimum wage is a second-best instrument to alleviate tax
distortions on the skill margin. If the government redistributes from the high-skilled to
the low-skilled and from the low-skilled to the unemployed, then it does so by setting
distortionary taxes on skill formation (sH [ sL) and low-skilled labour participation
(sL [ sU). By raising high-skilled employment and unemployment, the NIN minimum-
wage increase alleviates the tax-induced distortion on skill formation and exacerbates the
tax-induced distortion on low-skilled participation. That is, it generates a negative ﬁscal
externality by increasing unemployment and a positive ﬁscal externality by increasing
high-skilled employment. Proposition 1 establishes a second-best role for the minimum
wage if the revenue gains from reduced distortions in skill formation are large enough to
compensate for the revenue losses of increased participation distortions and the utility
losses of ineﬃcient rationing.
Notice that the case for or against the minimum wage does not depend on
subjective preference for redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled, or on
the magnitude of the empirically controversial labour-demand response to the
minimum wage. That is, marginal utilities and the demand elasticity are absent from
the desirability condition in equation (20). Intuitively, marginal utilities of the high-
and low-skilled do not matter because we compare an increase in the minimum wage
with a distributionally equivalent tax reform. Because both policy reforms
redistribute the same amount of resources, the only relevant matter is whether a
minimum wage does this more or less eﬃciently than the tax system. Moreover, the
wage elasticity of labour demand is irrelevant because both the relative costs of a
higher minimum wage (revenue losses of more unemployment and utility losses of
rationing) and the relative beneﬁts of a higher minimum wage (revenue gains of more
high-skilled employment) are proportional to the total reduction in low-skilled
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employment. It is not the amount of rationing that matters. Instead, it is the
proportion of rationed individuals who become high-skilled workers (q) that crucially
determines the desirability of a higher minimum wage.
A necessary condition
Proposition 1 shows that the desirability of an increase in the minimum wage must be
driven by its eﬀect on skill formation. However, the desirability condition in
equation (20) has two drawbacks. First, even though it does not depend on the marginal
utilities of high- and low-skilled workers, it does depend on the change in utility of
rationed individuals, which we cannot measure empirically. Second, it also depends on
the rationing schedule, particularly on the value of q, which is similarly hard to measure.
Fortunately, both drawbacks can be alleviated by recognizing that the utility losses are
weakly positive and thus have a lower bound of zero. An increase in the minimum wage
can therefore be more desirable than a distributionally equivalent change in taxes only if
the left-hand side of equation (20) is positive. This provides us with a necessary condition
for the desirability of an increase in the minimum wage that does not require any
knowledge on either the social valuation of utility or the rationing schedule. This is
established by the following result.
Corollary 1. A necessary condition for a minimum-wage increase to be more desirable
than a distributionally equivalent change in the tax system is that an NIN minimum-
wage increase raises public revenue (dB [ 0):
ðsH  sLÞ q
1 q [ ðs
L  sUÞ:ð21Þ
Or, equivalently,
ðsH  sLÞ dH
dU
[ ðsL  sUÞ:ð22Þ
Proof. Equate the right-hand side of equation (20) to zero and rewrite the expression to
obtain equation (21). Substitute for equations (17) and (19) to obtain equation (22).
Thus an NIN increase in the minimum wage can be desirable only if it raises public
revenue. There are two special cases in which dW=k ¼ 0, so that equation (21) or (22) is
both a necessary and a suﬃcient condition for an increase in the minimum wage to be
desirable. The ﬁrst special case is obtained if rationing is eﬃcient and there is no pre-
existing rationing. In that case, rationed individuals do not suﬀer utility losses because
they are indiﬀerent between low-skilled employment and unemployment or high-skilled
employment. The second special case is obtained if social preferences are Rawlsian rather
than utilitarian, so that we can write W ¼ VU instead of equation (13). With Rawlsian
preferences, the government simply does not care about the utility losses of rationed
low-skilled workers, so that dW=k ¼ 0.
Equation (21) once more illustrates the critical importance of the rationing schedule
as captured by q. An increase in the minimum wage, compared to a distributionally
equivalent change in taxes, is more likely to raise revenue if rationing leads to more high-
skilled employment, that is, if q is higher. Given that we lack information on the
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rationing schedule, q/(1  q) could be anywhere between zero and inﬁnity. Fortunately,
equation (22) shows that we can rewrite this term as the increase in high-skilled
employment relative to the increase in unemployment: q/(1  q) = dH/dU. Thus we do
not need any knowledge of the rationing schedule if we can obtain a measure of dH/dU.
In other words, the causal eﬀect of unemployment on high-skilled employment—for
given net wages—can function as a suﬃcient statistic for the rationing schedule
(cf. Chetty 2009).
We can use Corollary 1 to determine whether an increase in the minimum wage is
possibly desirable (if equation (22) holds) or certainly undesirable (if equation (22) is
violated) by using empirical estimates of the relevant tax wedges on unemployment
(sL  sU) and skill formation (sH  sL), and the eﬀect of low-skilled unemployment on
skill formation dH/dU. As mentioned before, there is a sizeable literature that estimates
the eﬀects of low-skilled unemployment on school enrollment rates (e.g. Clark 2011).
These, together with the tax wedges on unemployment and schooling, could be used to
calibrate equation (22).19 Unfortunately, the estimates on schooling responses all rely on
business-cycle variation in unemployment rates, while the rationing associated with the
minimum wage is more structural in nature. Moreover, the high-skilled employment
response is probably not fully captured by changes in formal schooling but also includes
job-to-job transitions to higher-skilled occupations. Corollary 1 therefore highlights the
need for more empirical research into the eﬀects of structural low-skilled unemployment
on high-skilled employment.
A binding minimum wage as part of the overall optimum
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 can be applied to evaluate the desirability of a minimum-
wage increase for any given allocation. An allocation that is of particular interest is the
tax optimum in absence of a minimum wage. If an NIN minimum-wage increase is
desirable in the tax optimum, then a minimum wage must be part of the overall optimum.
The tax optimum is deﬁned by the set of taxes fsU; sL; sHg that maximizes the social
welfare function in equation (13) subject to the government budget constraint in
equation (14). Deriving the tax optimum in the absence of a binding minimum wage, and
evaluating the desirability condition of the minimum wage at this allocation, yields the
following result.
Proposition 2. In the absence of a binding minimum wage, the optimal tax system
features taxes that are increasing with income: sH [ sL [ sU. As a result, a binding
minimum wage is part of the overall optimum if rationing is suﬃciently eﬃcient and
q suﬃciently high at the tax optimum.
Proof. We prove the ﬁrst part of the proposition in the Appendix. The second part
follows immediately from imposing sH [ sL [ sU on the desirability condition in
Proposition 1.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 is intuitively straightforward. The government optimally
redistributes from the employed to the unemployed because the marginal utility of
consumption of the employed is smaller than that of the unemployed. It therefore sets
sL [ sU. Similarly, the government optimally redistributes from the high-skilled to the
low-skilled because the marginal utility of consumption of the high-skilled is smaller than
that of the low-skilled. It therefore sets sH [ sL. Given that optimal taxes are increasing
Economica
© 2019 The Authors. Economica published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and
Political Science
2019] MINIMUM WAGE 17
with income, increases in high-skilled employment lead to revenue gains, and increases in
unemployment lead to revenue losses. From Proposition 1, it then follows that a binding
minimum wage is potentially part of the overall optimum. Starting from the overall tax
optimum, it is optimal to introduce a minimum wage if q is suﬃciently high—so that an
NIN minimum-wage increase leads to revenue gains—and rationing is suﬃciently
eﬃcient— so that the utility losses are limited.
Relation to the literature
The two studies that are most closely related to ours are Marceau and Boadway (1994)
and Lee and Saez (2012). Marceau and Boadway (1994) consider a model with exogenous
skills. They ﬁnd that a minimum wage can be desirable only if the low-skilled employed
pay less taxes than the unemployed, so that an increase in unemployment leads to revenue
gains. Lee and Saez (2012) draw the same conclusion in their Proposition 3, which also
considers exogenously given skills. We capture these results as special cases. To see this,
consider q = 0, which would imply that the skill distribution is unaﬀected by rationing. In
that case, Proposition 1 shows that a minimum wage can be desirable only if the low-
skilled employed pay less taxes than the unemployed (sL\ sU)—as in Marceau and
Boadway (1994) and Proposition 3 in Lee and Saez (2012). This could be the case with
suﬃciently generous in-work beneﬁts. Intuitively, if tax policy yields an upward distortion
of low-skilled participation, then a minimum wage alleviates this distortion by rationing
individuals out of the low-skilled labour market.20 We generalize these ﬁndings by
allowing for endogenous skill formation. Contrary to earlier studies, we show in
Proposition 1 that a minimum wage can be desirable even if participation is taxed. The
reason for this is that a minimum-wage increase raises both unemployment and high-
skilled employment.
Lee and Saez (2012) do allow for endogenous skill formation in their Proposition 2,
while assuming that rationing is eﬃcient and income taxes are optimally set. They
consider a diﬀerent policy reform. Instead of a minimum-wage increase, they study an
increase in the low-skilled transfer, while keeping low-skilled wages constant with a
minimum wage. A binding minimum wage must be part of the policy optimum if this
reform is desirable in the tax optimum without a minimum wage. They ﬁnd that this is
the case if the social welfare weight of the low-skilled exceeds 1, or, in our notation, if
bL  v0(cL)/k > 1. It can be shown that the desirability condition in Proposition 1 can
be reduced to bL > 1 only if rationing is indeed eﬃcient and taxes are set optimally
(Gerritsen and Jacobs 2016). Contrary to Proposition 2 of Lee and Saez (2012), our
desirability condition is valid for any eﬃcient or ineﬃcient rationing schedule, and can be
evaluated at any allocation inside or outside the tax optimum.21 Furthermore, our
necessary condition in Corollary 1 does not depend on social welfare weights, but
consists only of variables with empirical counterparts.
Robustness
In deriving our results, we made a number of assumptions that warrant further
discussion.
Sequencing of rationing and participation decisions. We assumed that individuals make
their labour-supply decisions after they ﬁnd out whether they are rationed out of the low-
skilled labour market. Consequently, they can still move into high-skilled employment if
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they are unable to ﬁnd a low-skilled job. Alternatively, we could assume that individuals
make their participation decisions before knowing whether they will be rationed out of
the low-skilled labour market. In that case, individuals take into account that there is a
positive probability that they lose their low-skilled job. In Online Appendix B, we show
that Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 carry over in modiﬁed form to this diﬀerent
sequencing of labour-supply decisions and rationing realizations. Our results remain
qualitatively unaﬀected if we adopt this alternative sequencing of rationing realizations
and labour-supply decisions. In particular, compared to a change in income taxes, a
minimum-wage increase causes additional rationing. This raises the probability of low-
skilled unemployment and thereby induces some individuals to switch to high-skilled
employment. Welfare eﬀects consist of utility losses from rationing and public revenue
gains and losses from increased high-skilled employment and unemployment. As a result,
a minimum-wage increase is desirable if and only if the revenue gains from additional
high-skilled employment are large enough to oﬀset any revenue and utility losses from
higher unemployment.
Multidimensional heterogeneity. We restricted our model by assuming that all
diﬀerences between individuals can be captured by ability h. A more general setup allows
individuals to diﬀer in low-skilled ability hL and high-skilled ability hH, both drawn from
some joint distribution G(hL,hH). Disutility of low-skilled work would equal 1/hL, and
disutility of high-skilled work would equal 1/hH. 22 Labour-supply decisions then depend
on both hL and hH. This more general setup allows for a high-skilled participation margin;
that is, it allows for individuals that are indiﬀerent between unemployment and high-
skilled employment, and prefer both options over low-skilled employment. This is ruled
out in the case of one-dimensional heterogeneity. In Online Appendix C, we extend our
model to allow for two-dimensional heterogeneity. We demonstrate that Proposition 1
and Corollary 1 perfectly carry over to this more general setting.23 As we know from
Diamond (1980), Saez (2002) and Christiansen (2015), the optimal low-skilled tax might in
that case be either greater or smaller than the unemployment tax. Intuitively, the
government might want to redistribute from the unemployed to the low-skilled employed
in order to alleviate distortions on the high-skilled participation margin. If sH [ sU [ sL
in the tax optimum, then a minimum wage would always generate more revenue than a
distributionally equivalent tax change. As low-skilled participation is distorted upwards
and skill formation is distorted downwards, rationing alleviates both distortions by raising
unemployment and high-skilled employment. As a result, the necessary condition of
Corollary 1 would in that case be fulﬁlled. Proposition 1 still requires rationing to be
suﬃciently eﬃcient for a minimum-wage increase to be more desirable than a
distributionally equivalent change in taxation.
Number of skill types. We could extend the model by allowing for more than two skill
types in production as well as for multiple other factors of production. In that case, only
the lowest skill type would be subject to a binding minimum wage. Our results would
remain unaﬀected, provided that the government is able to tax every factor of production
separately, so that the redistributive eﬀects of a minimum wage can be perfectly
mimicked by a distributionally equivalent tax reform. The same argument is made by Lee
and Saez (2012).
Intensive margin.We could allow individuals to decide on both their skill type and the
number of hours that they work. This generates income inequality among individuals
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with the same skill type if their ability also aﬀects disutility of working hours. Given that
the government could enforce a binding minimum wage, informational consistency
requires that the government sets skill-speciﬁc income taxes. We show in Gerritsen and
Jacobs (2014) that this would leave our results on the desirability of an NIN minimum-
wage increase unaﬀected.24
V. CONCLUSION
Is a minimum wage an appropriate instrument for redistribution? To answer this question,
this paper compares the minimum wage with income taxation in an occupational-choice
model with competitive labour markets. Compared to a distributionally equivalent change
in taxes, a higher minimum wage raises low-skilled wage costs, which leads to low-skilled
labour rationing. The distribution of labour rationing critically determines the desirability
of a minimum wage. Depending on which individuals are rationed out of the labour
market, some of them become unemployed while others decide to upgrade their skills in
order to avoid unemployment and ﬁnd high-skilled employment instead. If taxes are
increasing with income, then rationed individuals who become unemployed pay less taxes,
while those who become high-skilled pay more taxes. Moreover, if rationing is ineﬃcient,
then it causes utility losses because rationed individuals become involuntarily unemployed
or involuntarily high-skilled employed. A minimum-wage increase is more desirable than a
distributionally equivalent tax change if and only if the revenue gains from increased high-
skilled employment outweigh both the revenue losses from increased unemployment and
the utility losses from ineﬃcient rationing.
A necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum wage is that the revenue
gains from increased high-skilled employment outweigh the revenue losses from
increased unemployment. We express this condition in terms of three suﬃcient statistics:
the tax wedge on participation, the tax wedge on skill formation, and the increase in
high-skilled employment for a given increase in unemployment. The logical next step is to
bring the necessary condition for the desirability of the minimum wage to the data. While
there is empirical evidence that unemployment raises enrolment in education, this
evidence is almost exclusively based on the eﬀects of variations in business-cycle
unemployment on high-school enrolment rates (e.g. Clark 2011). An important avenue
for further research is to obtain plausibly causal evidence on the eﬀects of structural
unemployment on educational attainment and occupational choice. Along with data on
the tax wedges on unemployment and skill formation, this would allow us to calibrate the
desirability condition and determine whether a minimum wage increase is more or less
desirable than income redistribution via income taxes.
Other promising directions for future research on the desirability of minimum wages
are the following. First, our general rationing schedule may be fruitfully applied to analyse
the desirability of minimum wages in settings with non-competitive labour markets.
Recent empirical evidence on minimum wages suggests that monopsony power may be a
relevant feature of low-skilled labour markets (Manning 2016). Second, to rationalize the
use of a minimum wage for income redistribution, further research may resort to non-
welfarist notions of justice or non-standard individual preferences. That is, a non-welfarist
may argue that all working individuals should be able to earn a suﬃciently high ‘living
wage’ in the private sector without relying on government transfers. Alternatively,
individuals might care about the source of their income, and derive more satisfaction from
wage payments than from government transfers (for evidence, see Akay et al. 2012).
Third, further research might ﬁnd a useful role for a minimum wage that applies to only a
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subset of the working population, such as industry- or age-speciﬁc minimum wages (see
also Kabatek 2015; Kreiner et al. 2019). Indeed, our study suggests that minimum wages
may best be targeted to a subset of workers who have the highest propensity to continue
schooling if rationed out of the low-skilled labour market—such as the working youth.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, the NIN minimum-wage increase features
d(wi  si) = 0 for i 2 {H,L,U}. Substitute this into the derivatives of equations (1)–(6) to
obtain equation (16). Take derivatives of equations (7)–(9) and substitute for
equation (16) to ﬁnd the ﬁrst equalities in equations (17)–(19). Take the total derivative
of equation (12) and substitute for HFLH = LFLL, which follows from homogeneity
of degree zero of the marginal products, to ﬁnd dH/H  dL/L = ɛdwL/wL, where
ɛ  FL/(LFLL) > 0. Substitute for dH and dL from the ﬁrst equalities of equations
(17) and (18), and for the deﬁnition of q from equation (15), to
obtain
RH3
H1
duh dGðhÞ ¼ ae dwLwL ;with a  (1/L + q/H)1 > 0. Use the last result, along
with the deﬁnition of q, to ﬁnd the second equalities in equations (17)–(19). The ﬁnal
inequalities follow from a, ɛ > 0 and q 2 [0,1].
Proof of Proposition 1. The total eﬀect of the NIN minimum-wage increase on social
welfare equals dW=k þ dB, and dW=k is obtained by taking the total derivative of
equation (13):
dW
k
¼ 
Z H2
H1
VLh  VU
k
 
duh dGðhÞ 
Z H3
H2
VLh  VHh
k
 
duh dGðhÞ:ðA1Þ
We used equations (4)–(6), which imply that marginal changes in the critical levels of
ability do not aﬀect social welfare. Multiply and divide the ﬁrst term by
RH2
H1
duh dGðhÞ,
and the second term by
RH3
H2
duh dGðhÞ, substitute for equations (17) and (19), and use the
deﬁnitions of V
L
12, V
L
23 and V
H
23 to obtain
dW
k
¼  ð1 qÞ V
L
12  VU
k
 !
þ q V
L
23  VH23
k
 !" #
ae
dwL
wL
:ðA2Þ
The eﬀect of the NIN minimum-wage increase on B is obtained by taking the total
derivative of equation (14):
dB ¼ sU dUþ sL dLþ sH dHþ LdsL þH dsH:ðA3Þ
Substitute for dH, dL and dU from equations (17)–(19), and for dsH ¼ ðL=HÞ dsL from
Lemma 1, to obtain
dB ¼ qðsH  sLÞ  ð1 qÞðsL  sUÞae dwL
wL
:ðA4Þ
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Finally, the NIN increase in the minimum wage raises social welfare if and only if
dW=k þ dB [ 0. Substitute for equations (A2) and (A4) to establish the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. In the absence of a binding minimum wage, there is no
rationing (i.e. uh = 0 for all h) and the low-skilled wage is endogenously determined by
equation (12). Without rationing, equations (7) and (9) indicate that unemployment is
determined by the critical ability level H1, and high-skilled employment is determined by
the critical level H3. Moreover, from equations (4) and (6) we know that H1 depends only
on the net incomes of the unemployed and the low-skilled employed, and H3 depends only
on the net incomes of the low-skilled employed and the high-skilled employed.
Accordingly, we can write unemployment as a function U ¼ eUðcU; cLÞ, which is
increasing in cU ¼ sU and decreasing in cL ¼ wL  sL. Similarly, we can write high-
skilled employment as a function H ¼ eHðcL; cHÞ, which is decreasing in cL and increasing
in cH  wH  sH. Low-skilled employment follows residually from L = 1  U  H.
It is easiest to solve for the tax optimum by using the primal approach. That is, we
maximize social welfare subject to the economy’s resource constraint with respect to the
allocation (i.e. net wages ci) rather than taxes si. Substituting for equations (1)–(3),
si = wi  ci, and uh = 0 for all h into the social welfare function of equation (13) yields
W ¼
Z H1
0
vðcUÞdGðhÞþ
Z H3
H1
vðcLÞ1
h
 
dGðhÞþ
Z h
H3
vðcHÞ1þb
h
 
dGðhÞ :ðA5Þ
Notice that equations (4) and (6) imply that marginal changes in H1 or H3 do not aﬀect
social welfare. Substituting for si = wici and U ¼ eUðcU; cLÞ, H ¼ eHðcL; cHÞ and
L = 1  U  H into the budget constraint of equation (14) yields the economy’s
resource constraint:
B¼wLcLðwLcLþcUÞ eUðcU;cLÞþðwHcHwLþcLÞ eHðcL;cHÞR:ðA6Þ
Notice that marginal changes in gross wages do not directly aﬀect the budget
constraint. To see this, recall from Lemma 1 that dwH = (L/H) dwL. Taking the
derivative of equation (A6) with respect to gross wages, while leaving net wages
constant, thus yields
ð1UHÞ dwL þH dwH ¼ L dwL þH dwH ¼ 0:ðA7Þ
As usual, the Lagrangian for the government optimization problem can be written as
L  W þ kB. Substituting for equations (A5) and (A6), and taking derivatives with
respect to cH, cL and cU, yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
1
k
@L
@cH
¼ v
0ðcHÞ
k
 1
 
Hþ ðwH  cH  wL þ cLÞ @
eH
@cH
¼ 0;ðA8Þ
1
k
@L
@cL
¼ v
0ðcLÞ
k
 1
 
L ðwL  cL þ cUÞ @
eU
@cL
þ ðwH  cH  wL þ cLÞ @
eH
@cL
¼ 0;ðA9Þ
1
k
@L
@cU
¼ v
0ðcUÞ
k
 1
 
U ðwL  cL þ cUÞ @
eU
@cU
¼ 0:ðA10Þ
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To obtain these ﬁrst-order conditions, we used the fact that marginal changes in
critical ability levels and gross wages do not aﬀect the Lagrangian. These ﬁrst-order
conditions can be rewritten in terms of welfare weights, tax wedges and elasticities.
Substituting for social welfare weights bi  v0(ci)/k, net income ci  wisi, and
elasticities
eHsH 
@ eH
@cH
cH  cL
H
[ 0; eHsL  
@ eH
@cL
cH  cL
H
[ 0;
eUsL  
@ eU
@cL
cL  cU
U
[ 0; and eUsU 
@ eU
@cU
cL  cU
U
[ 0;
yields
1 bH ¼ s
H  sL
cH  cL
 
eHsH ;ðA11Þ
1 bL ¼ s
L  sU
cL  cU
 
U
L
eUsL 
sH  sL
cH  cL
 
H
L
eHsL ;ðA12Þ
1 bU ¼  s
L  sU
cL  cU
 
eUsU :ðA13Þ
In the tax optimum, the redistributional gains of each tax instrument—given by the left-
hand sides of equations (A10)–(A12)—must equal their marginal dead-weight losses—
given by the right-hand sides of equations (A10)–(A12).
We can prove by contradiction that equations (A10)–(A12) imply sH [ sL [ sU.
First note that any equilibrium with both high- and low-skilled workers must necessarily
have wH  sH [ wL  sL [  sU. Together with strict concavity of v(), this implies
that social welfare weights are strictly decreasing in income: bU > bL > bH. Now
consider sU  sL. Equation (12) then implies that bU ≤ 1. Moreover, equations (10) and
(11) then imply that bL ≥ 1 if sH  sL, and bH ≥ 1 if sH  sL. This contradicts decreasing
welfare weights. Thus in the optimum we must have that sL [ sU. Now consider
sL  sH. Equation (10) then implies that bH ≥ 1. Moreover, equations (11) and (12) then
imply that bL ≤ 1 if sL  sU, and bU ≤ 1 if sL  sU. This again contradicts decreasing
welfare weights. Thus in the optimum we must have that sH [ sL.
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NOTES
1. Indeed, the empirical literature on the economic consequences of the minimum wage is too vast to
summarize. For a number of recent contributions, see Cengiz et al. (2019) on employment and wages,
Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) on employment, revenue, proﬁts and capital stocks, and Bell and Machin
(2018) on the stock-market value of ﬁrms.
2. For copies of these letters, see Aaron et al. (2014) and Smith et al. (2014).
3. Our conclusions do not in any way depend on this particular reform, but it allows for the most transparent
comparison between a minimum wage and the tax and transfer system.
4. In the working paper version of this paper, we provide a ﬁrst pass at calibrating the necessary condition for
the desirability of a minimum wage (Gerritsen and Jacobs 2016). We ﬁnd that a minimum wage is strictly
less desirable than a distributionally equivalent change in taxes for most OECD countries, except possibly
the USA. However, to forcefully make this claim, one requires more reliable causal estimates on the eﬀects
of structural unemployment on skill formation than the literature currently provides.
5. They do ﬁnd a potentially useful role for the minimum wage if income taxation is restricted to a linear tax
rate. This is because a minimum wage can redistribute income in a way that a linear income tax cannot; see
also Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013).
6. Outside the optimum, their condition is informative only about the desirability of raising low-skilled
transfers, but not about the desirability of raising the minimum wage.
7. Our baseline model corresponds to the occupational-choice model of Saez (2002) with a low-skilled
participation margin and a skill margin, but without a high-skilled participation margin. The model in
Online Appendix C corresponds to the general case of Saez (2002) with both high- and low-skilled
participation margins and a skill margin.
8. If this condition is violated, then either no individual wants to be high-skilled or no individual wants to be
low-skilled. In particular, if H3 [ h, then every individual prefers to be either low-skilled or unemployed.
Moreover, if H3\H1, then every individual prefers to be either high-skilled or unemployed. If
h [ H3 [ H1, then equations (4)–(6) imply thatH3 [ H2 [ H1.
9. The rationing rate does not necessarily correspond to the standard deﬁnition of the unemployment rate,
because rationed individuals with ability h 2 ½H2;H3 decide to become high-skilled rather than
unemployed.
10. Eﬃcient rationing implies that only individuals with ability close to Θ1 or Θ3 are unable to ﬁnd a low-skilled
job. These individuals are indiﬀerent between low-skilled employment on the one hand, and involuntary
unemployment or high-skilled employment on the other. Uniform rationing implies that the rationing rate
is independent from ability, so that uh = u for all h 2 ½H1;H3.
11. Equations (11) and (12) uniquely pin down the ratio of production factors Hd/Ld, but not the scale of
production. The equilibrium scale of production is determined by equating labour demand (Hd and Ld as
given by equations (11) and (12)) and supply (H and L as determined by equations (7) and (8)).
12. This contrasts with a number of previous studies that are ‘informationally inconsistent’ (e.g. Guesnerie and
Roberts 1987; Allen 1987; Marceau and Boadway 1994; Boadway and Cuﬀ 2001; Blumkin and Danziger
2018; Danziger and Danziger 2015). These studies assume that information on individual wages can be used
to enforce a minimum wage, but not to condition taxes and transfers on wages, since this would allow the
government to reach ﬁrst-best. In our case, as in Lee and Saez (2012), ﬁrst-best cannot be reached even with
wage-speciﬁc taxes because individuals are heterogeneous with respect to disutility of work instead of
wages.
13. For empirical evidence on the distributional eﬀects of the US minimum wage, see, for example Teulings
(2003) and Autor et al. (2016). For the distributional eﬀects of the US tax system, see Piketty and Saez
(2007).
14. As we demonstrate in Gerritsen and Jacobs (2013), the comparative statics and welfare eﬀects of changes in
the minimum wage in isolation from taxes, or taxes in isolation from the minimum wage, are
straightforward, but mathematically tedious and notationally elaborate.
15. As will become apparent below, the reform may still reduce utility of the individuals who are rationed out of
the low-skilled labour market. Thus while the utility losses from ineﬃcient rationing are relevant for our
analysis, the valuation of redistribution from rich to poor is not.
16. Our approach is comparable to Christiansen (1981, 1984) and Kaplow (2008), among others. They study
combined reforms that raise a consumption tax (or public good provision, the tax on capital income, etc.)
while oﬀsetting all distributional implications by appropriate changes in the non-linear income tax. Like us,
they obtain simple desirability conditions that do not depend on social preferences for income
redistribution.
17. Moreover, there is a large empirical literature that ﬁnds a signiﬁcant direct eﬀect of minimum wages on
education. This literature is somewhat mixed. For example, Arulampalam et al. (2004) and Dustmann and
Sch€onberg (2009) ﬁnd positive eﬀects of the minimum wage on education, whereas Neumark and Wascher
(1995) and Montmarquette et al. (2007) ﬁnd negative eﬀects. However, studies that ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of
the minimum wage on education typically control for the unemployment rate. These ﬁndings may thus be in
line with our theoretical model, which predicts that a positive relationship between the minimum wage and
skill formation would run through higher unemployment rates.
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18. The same has been argued for ineﬃcient rationing of speciﬁc commodities, such as rental houses (Glaeser
and Luttmer 2003), gasoline (Frech and Lee 1987) or residential gas (Davis and Kilian 2011).
19. See our working paper version for a ﬁrst pass on this (Gerritsen and Jacobs 2016).
20. See also Hummel and Jacobs (2018), who demonstrate that labour unions can be desirable for income
redistribution to alleviate the distortions of excessive labour participation caused by participation subsidies.
21. Outside the tax optimum, Lee and Saez (2012) show that their condition (bL > 1) determines the
desirability of raising transfers to the low-skilled. However, the condition is not informative about the
desirability of raising the minimum wage.
22. The model in the main text is a special case of this more general setup, with hH = hL/(1 + b).
23. We also show that the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 need not hold in a model with multidimensional
heterogeneity.
24. The analysis in Gerritsen and Jacobs (2014) diﬀers in two ways from earlier intensive-margin frameworks
by Allen (1987) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1987). First, in their frameworks, the government is restricted
by an incentive constraint that the high-skilled should not prefer to ‘mimic’ the income of the low-skilled by
working less hours. This constraint is not relevant in our analysis as the government is assumed to condition
its income taxes on skill type. This is required by informational consistency because the government needs
to observe skill types in order to enforce the minimum wage. Unlike in Allen (1987) and Guesnerie and
Roberts (1987), skill-speciﬁc taxes do not lead to a trivial ﬁrst-best outcome, because individuals diﬀer not
only in their skill type, but also in their disutility of work. Second, unlike the earlier studies, we allow for a
skill decision. As in the current paper, this skill decision is generating a potential second-best role for the
minimum wage.
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